First,ten BUT...

Seth Godin's latest post "First, ten" highlights a classic start-up mistake, but for me misses an important step.
He suggests that you find ten people to use your service who "trust you/respect you/need you/listen to you...", that, " if they love it, you win. If they love it, they'll each find you ten more people (or a hundred or a thousand or, perhaps, just three). Repeat."
Seth Godin makes a key point here which we've seen many start-ups, large and small, all miss: if you require that your business grows virally, then all that spend on launch and PR is wasted if you do so when the product is not yet good enough to be viral by itself. That's not to say that PR etc. can't be great when you want to pour some petrol on that fire, but you're better saving up that fuel for when the fire is already spreading by itself.
However, I'd have to suggest some qualifiers. The test is not those "first ten", but whether those first ten start to "spread the virus" by themselves. That might well mean that they need to be considerably more than ten so that you can measure and understand them, but it certainly doesn't have to be ten thousand. Key to that viral spread is the communication from an existing user to a new one, and that's a tough barrier because the user chooses it, not you (how many different ways have you heard Twitter described?). My view is that Seth Godin's definition of the "first ten" might prove a little unrepresentative- they're clearly going to listen, and therefore give you the chance to communicate much more sophisticated and subtle ideas, you can "teach" new things, or even "un-teach" perceived wisdom. You could also get those first ten to think about what the service could mean to their lives and how they might use it, and it will be much more memorable. So I would suggest that the "first ten" test is necessary but not sufficient.
My suggestion, based on our portfolio, would be to aim for a larger group of people, grown gradually, and iterate the product, messaging and experience to the point that you start to see that demand is spreading "all by itself". Then go and get the petrol can!

The Boomerang Founder: read this before founding a company

David Cohen, and entrepreneur investor and technologist from Colorado has a post on his blog about the perils of co-founder relationships. I would recommend that anyone contemplating forming a company takes a look not just at the article, but equally at the comments of the people on his blog. It describes a problem very well that we see in a significant proportion of the companies that come to us for funding.

How "recession-proof" is your business?

The most popular boast now from entrepreneurs seeking funding is that their business is, to some degree, "recession proof". Whilst it will be some time before we know the magnitude and implications of the economic situation, we can attempt to help our portfolio companies understand how vulnerable they may be. Fred Wilson had an excellent post on the strength of his portfolio using something he dubbed The Survival Matrix. I thought I'd extend this a little by putting together a kind of recession-proofness-test that draws in some of the other issues. Please take the precise numbers with a big "pinch of salt": I am not planning on defending any of the weightings or rankings. I'd welcome any debate about what's included, but my purpose is to highlight issues and help give people a feel for where they stand. When I tried this test on a few portfolio companies it certainly showed a wide disparity. At the lowest 45 points and the highest 109 points out of a theoretical maximum of around 220. My view is that companies upto perhaps 50/60 points really need to think hard and urgently about making what might be quite big departures from plan. Whereas around "100 points" perhaps a slightly more considered view makes more sense even if the actions taken are still pretty firm. I can't imagine many VC-backed companies will get anywhere close to 200! I hope this test helps a little for companies to focus on just how much and how urgently their plans need to adapt. I'm doing a presentation around this stuff at our portfolio seminar this morning which I'll post up too. You can find the calculator here.

Choosing an Entry Market Sector

A common issue I see with early-stage companies is over their selection of entry market sector. Obviously, all investors love their portfolio companies to have a huge vision to change large markets in a big way, and on occasion the best way to plan to reach that is to go straight to the big opportunity head-on. However, often that's going to be slow and hard, perhaps credibility is crucial, in which case it's really helpful to find a launch "beach-head" in the lines advocated by "Crossing The Chasm".
So where companies have chosen to use a beach-head, the next question is which one? If you just pick the "largest sector", or the one you're "most familiar with, you face a danger- the best entry sector is not always the obvious one. I think there's a different set of thinking about launch markets, where you highlight a slightly different set of factors as important.

Criterion	Ultimate market	Launch market
Scale	Ideally as large as possible	Manageable, but low priority in selection process
Differentiation of offering against competition	Important	Critical
Focus on customer problems	Can be more general- boxed product is easier to scale	May be helpful to have solution type sales initially
Unit sale	Very large or small is good- scalability is crucial	Ideally ~1 months burn- large enough to be useful, but small enough to avoid lengthy approvals
Mission criticality	Mission critical to the customer provides extra value	Ideally not too critical- hard to buy from a startup
Length of buy cycle	May be long	Short is incredibly helpful
Easy customer identification	Useful	Vital

I bet there are some great suggestions for improvements to this table- please let me know!

Plan B for Fundraising

Guy Kawasaki has an interesting post comparing the merits of bootstrapping vs. early VC backing which is well worth reading. He nicely positions bootstrapping as a Plan B, and certainly makes it appear quite an attractive option. My own take would be:

	Outcome
	Product Sells	Product Doesn't Sell
Venture Backed	You exit and have to share some of the rewards* with the VCs	The company fails and everyone is unhappy.
Bootstrapped	You exit, but probably only after raising some money to give yourself strategic options and thereby boost the price.	The company fails and everyone is unhappy.

(* in our experience ventures that have insufficient capital to have other strategic options get sold for a lower price, so maybe the rewards would not be so different too.) So my advice would be to understand the future for your business and really decide if VC money changes the potential outcome in a good way. If it doesn't then don't take the money just to give yourself a salary along the way!

Technology Recruitment in an Early Startup

Daniel Tenner has a great post that is good reading for people looking to build early tech startups. I would just caveat his comments by suggesting that care is needed in understanding how you provide equity to those who help you out in those early steps. Daniel is completely right to suggest:

"You want them to feel that it’s their company, and to do that, you have to give them equity - not options, not promises of options, but actual founder’s equity. Don’t feel like you’re giving stuff away here. If you’ve got the right person for the job, ensuring that they feel ownership of the company will ensure that your share is worth something. It’s better to own 70 or 80 or even 51% of something than 100% of nothing."

However, bear in mind that there are two categories of people you might want to help out with a startup- and both can contribute a great deal

• Ideal hires- people who you would've hired to do the job at the full commercial rate if only you had the cash, and who you'd expect to continue to be perfect for the job in 3-12 months time.
• Opportunistic hires- people who are prepared to get involved early, before an ideal candidate would join, but who are probably not long-term management or key staff.

I would suggest that it is wise to think this through, and to talk it through openly with those involved, and make sure that the equity is allocated appropriately. I have seen many many founders who regretted having shared the company, often 50:50, with someone who ceased to be involved pretty quickly. I've seen founders who've been sweating to make the business work five years from the start, whilst their co-founder holds similar equity and has long since departed. Needless to say these founders tend to regret their decisions!